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DISCRETIONARY PO WER AN D
NORMATIVE DECISION -MAKING
AARON RENFRO

Because Congms cannot feasibly design a law tbat applies in every
circumstance, U.S. immigration law allows for a reasonable
interpretation ofmany ofits provisions and the exercise of
discretion in appropriate circumstances.

A

year ago, America's heart and mind turned toward a six-yearold Cuban boy named Elian Gonzalez. H e was found at sea by
passing fishermen who noticed a capsized boat floating in the
Florida straits. Having managed co survive for two days holding onto a
life ring, the boy was brought ro the United States. In the ensuing
months, America became divided as to Elian's fate and the boy became
part of an intense, high-profile political and legal battle. Despite
attempts of the politically powerful Cuban exile community to keep
the boy in the U.S., governmen t authorities returned Elian to rhe
custody of his father in Cuba.
This article addresses some of the important legal decisions made in
determining Elian's fate and discusses important normative principles
that guided government authorities in their decision-making process. It
wilJ become evident that government authorities acted in accordance
with the prescribed laws of the land. However, by applying the Attorney
General's discretionary power, and an alternative interpretation of
relevant statutes, a different, though legally justifiable, outcome could
have occurred. Because Congress cannot feasibly design a law that
applies in every circumstance, U.S. immigration law allows for a
reasonable interpretation of many of its provisions and the exercise of
discretion in appropriate circumstances. As a result, such laws may be
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interpreted to justify conclusions that oppose one another, placing an
added emphasis on normative decision-making, or what "should" be the
outcome. By opting to return Elian to Cuba, governmental authorities
placed priority of parental rights over other legitimate concerns. This
normative decision was fundamentally sound and based on morally
defensible reasoning.
Upon being found, Elian was immediately turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a sector of the Department of Justice overseeing and administering American immigration
matters. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the source
of U.S. immigration law, Elian was considered to be an applicant for
admittance into the United States.• Under such circumstances, the
Attorney General has discretionary authority to (I) continue to detain
an arrested alien, (2) release the alien on bond, or (3) release the alien
on conditional parole.2 Attorney General Janet Reno opted to place
Elian on conditional parole by placing him in temporary custody of his
Miami relatives, headed by his great-uncle Lazaro Gonzalez.
Giving parole status to Elian was the first of three occasions on
which the Attorney General used her "discretionary power." The
second was the denial of the asylum applications submitted by the
Miami relatives, and the third was the revoking of Elian's parole status
on April 12, 2000. Discretionary power in immigration matters is
derived from Congress, which legitimately delegates much of its
immigration power to the Attorney General. This power is most often
used when Congress fails to spell our specific standards that apply to a
given case. The Attorney General may rely on any reasonable factors in
exercising this discretionary power in order to arrive at an appropriate
outcome in a particular circumstance.J If a decision is challenged in
court, great deference is given to such discretionary authority and a
decision based on its exercise will be overturned only if it is determined
that the Attorney General acted unreasonably and thus abused such
discretion. Thus, the discretionary power stands as the source of legal
legitimacy the Attorney General uses to make his or her case if there is
no applicable objective law that dictates the outcome. Inherent in this
discretionary power is the freedom to make normative decisions that
align with the decision-makers' belief systems and moral perspectives.
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Shortly after being granted temporary custody of Elian, his Miami
:elacives filed three separate asylum applications in an effort to gain
;>ermanent cusrody. To determine rhe legitimacy of rhese applications,
;he INS and d1e Attorney General began a Legal analysis to decide who
bad legal authority to speak on behalf of the six-year-old. Was it Elian's
Father, his great-uncle in Mianu, or orher attorneys claiming to represent him? The INS examined U.S. immigration law, Cuban family law,
and Florida state law to make its decision. Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the general rule states, "Any alien who is physically
present in rhe U.S. or who arrives in the U.S. (including an alien who
is brought to the U.S. after having been interdicted in international or
U.S. waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum."•
The phrase "any alien" is not defined by the statute. Thus, rhe Attorney
General was required to use her discretionary power to determine if the
six-year-old fell within the definition.
To gain further insight, rhe INS and the Attorney General turned
to Cuban fanlily law, which provides that "minors shall be under the
authority of rheir parents and the parental aurhority is shared jointly by
both parents. Should one parent die, the surviving parent becomes the
sole individual aurhorized to speak for rhe child."~ These parental rights
include the duty to represent rhe rights of the child in all legal matters.
Regarding custody disputes between parents and third parties, Florida
law states, "When the custody dispute is between a parent and rhird
parties, ... the test must include consideration of rhe right of a natural
parent to enjoy the custody, fellowship, and companionship of his
offspring. This is a rule older rhan common law itself."6 Recognizing
that both Florida state law and Cuban family law emphasize parental
rights, the INS and Attorney General determined that the phrase "any
alien" in the INA statute did not apply to a six-year-old that had a legal
parent to speak on his behal£ Taking all factors into account, the INS
decided that without the formal consent of Elian's father Juan Miguel,
neither his great uncle, nor any attorney had legal authority to represent Elian in immigration matters.
Required to use her discretionary power, Attorney General Janet
Reno freely interpreted immigration laws and statutes in accordance
with her perception of the appropriate outcome. The subjectivity
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inherent in such normative decisions often creates controversy chat
imbues the nation's citizenry. Both those favoring Eliin's return and
chose opposing it provided normative explanations of their own rooted
in moraJiy justi.6.able reasoning. However, the discretion is left: co the
Attorney General co determine what principles are applicable to chis
case. Favoring Elian's return co Cuba, the Attorney General and the INS
focused on laws promoting the rights of legitimate parents over their
children in immigration matters. These laws are based on che w1derlying
principle that families are the fundamental unit of every sociery and
deserve the utmost respect and protection from forces of disintegration.
This principle should be used as a scandard in immigration matters and
as a guiding policy in future cases. The U.S. government has no right co
interfere in viable family units that are characterized by loving relationships and mutual support. Laws must not promote the disintegration of
viable family units, but instead seek co protect them.
Continuing their evaluation of the case, the INS and Attorney
General interviewed Elian's father to evaluate his relationship with the
boy and to determine if the Cuban government had coerced him in any
way. If government authorities found evidence of coercion, they could
justify a decision on Elian's behalf without regards to the father's
wishes. Thus, they could reverse their previous reasoning emphasizing parental rights over their children. However, INS officials sent to
interview the father determined chat the Cuban government had not
influenced the father's interests and instead found an endearing fatherson relationship. Consequently, the government officials saw no reason
co deny Elian's father his parental rights.
By our detailing some of the important events preceding the INS
final decision, it is evident that government authorities interpreted both
U.S. and Cuban laws in a reasonable fashion. Because no objective law
was applicable to chis case, a necessity arose for the Attorney General co
use her discretionary power, allowing for her own values and principles
co determine the outcome. These normative values promoted parental
rights and family values. They considered the rights of a loving fiuher co
have custody of his child paramount to ocher concerns that suggested a
different outcome. Without convincing evidence char a parent's interests
fail co align with his or her child's legal interests, parental rights should
be given priority in immigration matters.
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A Different Outcome
Had the Elian Gonzalez case occurred during the term of a
djfferent U.S. administration, could the result have differed? The
answer is "yes." The preceding paragraphs provided an analysis of some
of che important legal decisions made concerning Elian's bee and a
normative anaJysis used in support. Although government authorities
used both U.S. and Cuban law in their interpretation, the following
analysis indicates that a decision to keep Eliin in the United States
could also have been legally justified. However, legal justification does
not necessarily signify moraJ justification. Normative principles must
be used to determine the appropriate outcome co the case.
When government authorities denied Elian the right to apply for
asylum, Eliin's Miami relatives chaJlenged the decision in federaJ court,
asking for a temporary restraining order on the ruling. Upon bearing
the case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of appeaJs determined that Elian
had a right to appeaJ for asylum and cited possible abuses of power by
government authorities. Essentially, the court took a different approach
to the lNA generaJ rule previously seated, "Any alien who is physically
present in the U.S. or who arrives in the U.S .... irrespective of such
alien's status, may apply for asylum."" The Eleventh Circuit considered
the phrase "any aJien" broad enough to include a six-year-old boy. This
broad interpretation, called the "plain language approach," seeks co
interpret laws as they are plainly written in text, disregarding inferences
made from them or other laws that may skew their originaJ intent. The
court reasoned that "if Congress had meant to include only some
aliens, perhaps Congress would not have tLSed the words 'any alien."'s
Although later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that neither the INS nor the Attorney General
bas the right to infringe on the plain language of the statute, nor could
the INS narrow the scope of the statute through regulation. ~ Any
evidence of such action would be deemed an abuse of power. If the
INS and the Attorney General had opted to use a pbin language
approach in their decision-making process, they may have considered
the case to be of "special interest" in which the rights of a child to
live in America outweigh the parenta1 rights of a father living in a
totalitarian/communist regime.
Because a different interpretation could have guided the case in the
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opposite direction, it is important ro determine if asylum could have
appropriately been awarded to Elian had the Attorney General and INS
accepted the applications for d1e reasons cited. The Immigration and
Nationality Act allows the Attorney General co grant asylum or refugee
status to those utdividuals who are (1) outside their country or nationaliry, {2) unable to or unwilling to return or to avail themselves of the
protection of chat country, (3) being persecuted or have a well-founded
fear of persecution, (4) based on race, religion, nacionaliry, membership
in a particular social group, or political opiruon. 10
Elian could have easily met the first two tenets of the INA
definition of "asylee" or "refugee." In addition to being outside of
his country of descent, evidence also existed of Elian's desire to stay in
the United Stares. However, attorneys would have needed a strong
argument to convince rhe government char the remaining tenets
applied to Elian's case. They would have ro prove that Elian could
reasonably fear greater harm than other Cubans. Attorneys could have
argued chat if Elian returned to Cuba, Fidel Castro would use Elian as a
symbol of his regime, placing the child under life-long scrutiny. 11 This
scrutiny would have required that his actions follow every tenet of the
Cuban Revolution, which American law deems as a form of persecution. Attorneys could have also argued that Elian feared persecution
based on a social group including chose exposed to the freedoms of the
United States. Furthermore, arguments against Fidel Castro's human
rights record and his defiling treatment of Cubans interdicted at sea
may have proved convincing.
Numerous arguments could have attested to a well-founded fear of
persecution awaiting Elian in Cuba. From a legal perspective, had these
applications been accepted, these arguments could have easily justified
a decision co grant Elian asylum. Thus, that same power used by the
Attorney General to remove Elian from the United States could also
have been used to grant him asylum. For that reason a different U.S.
administration may have chosen an alcernarive destiny for Elian. Either
outcome could have occurred within a reasonable interpretacion of
immigration laws.
Although the legal perspective would allow for the justification of
either outcome, normatively speaking, it is essential to follow principles
that are in the best inrerest of the child and the family. Those opposing
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the Arrorney General's decision to return Elian to Cuba argued that
sending the boy back to a totalitarian/communist government was a
moral crime. It was semencing a child to a life of misery and a violation
of American principles such as freedom, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. These arguments are understandable and deserve attention.
However, they support the replacing of a :f.ither with a government.
Governments must never remove the agency of a parent by placing
grearer priority of their decisions over those of a loving parent. This is
outside of the jurisdiction of any governmem. Juan Miguel, Elian's
father, was interviewed and determined to be a loving father with
genuine concern for the life of his child. Such evidence should signal to
government decision-makers that the parent has the ultimate say in the
matter.
Had Elian's father opted to live in the United States with his son,
perhaps both sides would have been appeased. Although contrary to
the beliefs of many, the decision of Elian's father to return to Cuba
must be respected and protected by the government. The Attorney
General and the INS acted with reasonable discretion in determining
the fate of Elian. By placing priority on parental rights, their decisions
were morally justifiable and established a standard to guide immigration law in the appropriate direction.
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